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Abstract— Wireless sensor networks in internet of thing era have many applications, one of them for environment system, in 
environmental monitoring system everybody can access data anytime and anywhere. Information was collected using 
wireless sensor network, all of the data will be sent and stored in the data center. All of data in the data center can be 
accessed by users through HTTP protocol using a laptop, smartphone and Personal computer. The data in the data center 
must be secured and the data should be protected from the illegal access by the users from the environment monitoring. To 
secure the data from the illegal access by the user then the environment monitoring required a security with revocation 
aspect and encryption the data. CP-ABE (Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption) becomes a solution for this issue, 
to protect the sensor data and revoke the user. We propose a secure system using CP-ABE with user revocation for 
protecting the data in data center. Our system is not only encrypting the data sensor, but also revoke to the user. Our 
experiments system using CP-ABE showed the result for secure the sensor data and revoked the user who does not have the 
access rights. there are only 2 second processing time for revocation check users.    
Keywords— wireless sensor networks; environment monitoring; CP-ABE; user revocation. 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have many 
applications in the internet of things era. One of them is an 
application for environment monitoring [2][3][4][5]. The 
environmental monitoring system uses WSN technology to 
obtain information such as carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, 
temperature, humidity, luminosity, and noise. The data 
obtained from WSN will be sent to a data center that can be 
accessed by the users who want to get information from the 
environmental system. In the end, that data can be used for a 
research, a business planning, and to find out the quality of 
an area. The collected data in the data center should be easily 
read by the user. The data center without security can be 
intercepted, tracked and even modified by the user without 
the access rights [1].  The system requires an encryption for 
the data sensor in the data center to protect the data from the 
illegal user. 
To protect the sensor data in the data center, there are so 
many methods from previous researchers in contexts of data 
security, for example, a system that performs an encryption 
for the sensor data with Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based 
Encryption with authentication using HMAC [3]. This 
method is the best to protect data from the user who did not 
have the access right. But this method has a problem, that it 
cannot protect the data center if the user with the access right 
did an illegal access. Because of the importance of the 
existing data, in the data center, then the system requires a 
data security and restriction on the accessing aspect. Only 
registered users and the ones who have access rights can 
view the data. In this case, there will be a problem, if there 
are users who perform the illegal access. To answer these 
problems, then the revocation of access is required. One of 
the cryptographic solutions for secure and revoke the user is 
the use of CP-ABE with Revocation schemes [10]. 
ABE (Attribute Based Encryption) [11] is a new approach 
for encrypted access control. It offers security and access 
control. CP-ABE (Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based 
Encryption) [3] is one of the variant of ABE algorithm. CP-
ABE is an asymmetric encryption mechanism that provides 
features using the user attributes as rule of policy in the 
ciphertext. In CP-ABE, the ciphertext will be decrypted if 
and only if the attribute set of user’s private key appropriate 
with the rule policy in the ciphertext. CP-ABE is appropriate 
for most applications, like for data exchange over wireless 
medium [3]. 
In this paper, we propose a secure system to protect the 
data center from illegal access user using web-based 
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communication applied java server page with HTTP 
protocol for IoT in environmental monitoring system case 
study. In this research, we consider for constructing a 
security system in web-based for the environmental 
monitoring system. We adopt the CP-ABE algorithm for 
secure data sensor in the data center and revoke the user. 
The contribution of this paper, we implement CP-ABE 
applied HTTP protocol for communication using java server 
pages including the revocation for the user with the access 
right if the user did the illegal access. The system will be 
secured all of the data in the data center with encrypted 
before sending to the user. The system can be accessed by 
the user anywhere and anytime use their end devices such a 
smartphone, laptop and personal computer. 
II. MATERIAL AND METHOD 
Recently, many researchers has been researched about the 
environmental monitoring system. Fahmi, et al. [5] proposed 
a fuzzy logic for implementation of environmental health 
monitoring system based on WSN. The communication 
between the sensor node and the gateway use ZigBee 
802.15.4 standard protocol. This research is applied real 
hardware using Microcontroller ATMega 1281 and Gases 
Sensor Board developed by Waspmote. 
An environmental system without security will be 
affected to the original data where the user can intercept, 
tracked and even modified the data. The research for secure 
data has many methods for protecting the original data from 
illegal access, for example. Sudarsono, et al. [1] proposed a 
security method use the authentication system using pairing-
based verifier-local revocation group signature scheme to 
authenticate wireless node of a particular privilege group to 
the gateway node in transmission data. The researchers used 
VLR group signature to reduce the revocation mechanism in 
the user and omit some procedures in Registration phase and 
Authentication phase of previous VLR group signature 
scheme. This research was applied in the real hardware using 
Raspberry Pi2 for sensor and gateway node, PC with Intel 
Core i7 2.60 GHz and Broadcom BCM43xx 1.0 for data 
center with 4 GB RAM, 1.80 Ghz with 2 GB RAM  and 
Intel Dual Band Wireless-N 7260 IEEE802.11 a/b/g/n for 
User and for communication using TP-Link TL-WN722N 
150 Mbps IEEE802.11b/g/n.. 
The secure system for protecting the data is very growing 
very rapidly. In the previous research [1], the researcher 
implemented the pairing-based verifier-local revocation 
group signature scheme for secure the transmission data. but 
in this research data in the data center is not secure because 
data was still in the form of the original data. The user with 
access right can directly read data. the only user in 
revocation list can’t read the data because his transmission 
will be rejected by the system. There are many method to 
protect the data [3][6], where they analyzed the secure data 
with encryption. Make a palintext become a ciphertext with 
Ciphertext Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE). 
They are using the wireless and mobile protocol for 
communication not using the HTTP Protocol. In their 
research, they are just secure the data, but they not do the 
revocation for the user. The system not protecting the data 
center if the user with access right do the illegal access. The 
system from researcher only use in limitted area, user cannot 
access anywhere and anytime. 
The previous researcher Huda, et al. [3] combined the 
method using Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption 
with Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) for 
integrity the data. The researcher uses the scheme for the 
military environment in the battlefield with the 
communication between soldier and captain using Mobile 
Ad-Hoc Network (MANET).  The system is secured the 
information exchange protocol between all soldier. Using 
CP-ABE for secure the data and HMAC for integrity the 
data. All of the data will be encrypt using AES method 
before send to the other soldier. The only soldier with access 
right can read the original data. 
Roy, et al. [10] proposed a security method using 
Ciphertext Attribute-Based Encryption for Disruption 
Tolerant Network.  The researcher is applied CP-ABE with 
combining AES method for secure the data. the system 
handling the static and dynamic attributes the DTN Users 
where static attributes whose value remain unchanged for a 
long time and dynamic attributes which need to be updated 
periodically. This method is also using revocation technique 
where each message to be encrypted with a modified access 
policy, which is constructed by augmenting the original 
access policy with an additional list of revoked user ID. 
Formally, the new access policy (T) structure is as follows: 
T’ = (T AND ((NOT X1) AND (NOT X2) AND (NOT 
Xn))), where users X1, X2, Xn have been revoked. 
The previous researcher Huda, et al. [10] combined the 
method using Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption 
with Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) for 
integrity the data. The researcher uses the scheme for 
ubiquitous environmental health monitoring with HTTP 
protocol communication. The system is secure the data 
center with encrypting the data sensor use the CP-ABE and 
HMAC for integrity the data. 
L. Touati, et. Al. [19] using the method Cooperative 
Ciphertext Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (C-CP-ABE) 
for the Internet of Things. The researcher compares the 
original CP-ABE method with their method C-CP-ABE. The 
researcher using C-CP-ABE to secure the communication 
between node in the IoT but the problem in this method is 
not able to secure data in the data center. Users with the 
access right can access anything. In our scheme, we need the 
system to protect all of data in the data center from illegal 
access user with the access right and only user with the 
access right can access the data.    
We propose our scheme for environment monitoring with 
secure data and revoke user from previous 
researcher[3][9][10][19]. To secure data sensor in the data 
center we using the method from previous researcher [11] 
for encrypting the data sensor in the data center but the 
problem is we cannot revoke user with the access right if the 
user did the illegal access. The previous researcher proposes 
the method can revoke user with include NOT logic in the 
policy of ciphertext[9]. All of the users can make policy for 
encrypting the data with NOT logic to revoke user. We 
cannot apply this method to our scheme. From this method 
we combine and modified this method using web-based for 
revoke user who did the illegal access. The only user with 
access right can read the original data sensor.   
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In this section, we describe the different method between 
original CP-ABE and our proposed CP-ABE.  
A. Original Scheme Ciphertext Attribute-Base Encryption 
In the original CP-ABE scheme [6], a message M will be 
encrypt using the public key (PK) and access policy that 
associated with user attributes. The access policy is 
expressed by a logical on attributes from the user. Each user 
has a set of attributes which expressed information like 
shown in Fig. 1. 
The secret key (SK) will generate by trusted party such as 
Key Distribution Center (KDC). After the KDC Generated 
the key, the key will be sent to the user. The user uses the 
Public Key and attributes for encrypting the original 
message to be a ciphertext. The only user has attributes 
matched with the access policy can successfully decrypt and 
read the original message 
. 
 
Fig. 1. Scheme of the original  CP-ABE system. 
B. Ciphertext Attribute-Base Encryption with Revocation Scheme 
In scheme of CP-ABE with revocation, the system same 
with the original CP-ABE but the different is system add 
NOT logical in the rule of access policy. If the user in a 
revocation list, the attribute will be add NOT Logical in 
ciphertext like shown on Fig. 2 and Fig. 3. only user is not in 
revocation list can decrypt the original message.
 
Fig. 2. Scheme of CP-ABE with revocation system for user is not in revocation list. 
Revocation 
Check 
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 Fig. 3. . Scheme of CP-ABE with revocation system for user in revocation list. 
 
In the CP-ABE scheme, there is four steps system such as:  
Setup: The system generate randomly output the master key 
(MK) and public key (PK) where MK is kept private. PK 
was sent to all user for encryption and decryption 
mechanism.  
Keygen: The system generate the secret key (SK) use MK 
and PK and attributes of the user. The user requests to KDC 
by issued their attributes. KDC executed the system and 
generated SK and PK for the user. 
Encryption: The system creates an original message (M) 
become a ciphertext (CT) using PK with user’s parameters 
attribute. The system is performed by all participating users 
as an encryptor. 
Decryption: On given CT and a secret key (SK) with the 
attributes of user, user who has matching to the attribute 
policy (T) associated with CT is able to recover the original 
message (M)proposed method cp-abe with user illegal 
access 
We proposed our secure system in the scenario for the 
environmental monitoring system. We using 1 node with six 
sensors there is carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, 
temperature, humidity, luminosity, and noise. Node sensor 
sends the sensor data using ZigBee to the meshlium, all of 
the data will be receipt by meshlium. Data in database 
meshlium we synchronize to the data center. In the data 
center, all of the data will be stored. To control the users 
who access the data, and secure the sensor data with illegal 
access to the data center of the environment monitoring 
system. We applied ciphertext policy attribute-based 
encryption with revocation to guarantee the confidentiality 
of the data, integrity, and user access rights. The system 
using HTTP protocol for all communication. The user can 
request data in the data center using end device such a smart 
phone, laptop and personal computer. The only user with 
access right can read the original data. the user without 
access right and in revocation list cannot read the original 
data from the data center. Fig 4. shows the proposed our 
system.  
 
 
 
Fig. 4.  system design secure data sensor in environmental monitoring using attribute-based encryption with revocation mechanism 
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User and manager make a registration with sending their 
identity, only to users, they select the attributes according to 
the field. Registered users and manager can request data to 
the data center through the HTTP protocol. The data center 
respond user’s request before the original data send to the 
user. The data will be encrypted, after the data center finish 
encrypt the data, the ciphertext directly sends to the user’s 
request.  Trusted third party conducted a survey of users 
accessing illegally. If the trusted third party found the user 
conduct the illegal access, the trusted third party directly 
include in the revocation list. Users in the revocation list will 
never be able read the original data from the data center. We 
propose a CP-ABE to encrypt the data sensor in the data 
center. There are storing data such as temperature, humidity, 
CO, CO2, humidity, noise, and also the data from manager 
and users. User and manager can access the data from the 
data center through the web, where the data can be decrypted 
with the private key and the attributes that appropriate with 
access policies. We proposed the system with three actors 
such as Fig. 4. 
Manager: a person who can decrypt all data. The 
manager is different from the users. The manager can access 
all data according to their access rights and send a message 
report to the third trust party for removing the user from 
revocation list. 
User: a person who can only access the data according to 
their access right. The user only decrypts the data with the 
same policies with their attribute. The user who conducts the 
illegal access will be included in the revocation list. 
Trust Third Party: a person trusted by the manager and 
user to confirm and enter the user into the revocation list. 
Data Center: the storage media where the data sensor,  
user, and manager are stored. The other functions of the data 
center are doing the generation of the master, private, and 
public keys, where the private key and public key will be 
distributed to registered managers and users.  
we design three protocols, those are a registration 
protocol, a sharing data protocol, and a revocation protocol: 
1)  Registration Protocol:  Fig. 5 shows the flow of user 
registration, where the data center is generating master keys 
and public keys. Manager and user make registration by 
entering a username, password, and attribute. Registration is 
validated by a trust third party to be stored in the data center. 
Then, the data center will generate the key there is private 
key and public key. The key is distributed to the manager 
and users who have already done the registration. Registered 
users can use the key to decrypt the ciphertext form data 
center to read the original sensor data 
 
Fig. 5. Registration Protocol. 
 
2)  Data Sharing Protocol:  Fig. 6 shows the flow of data 
sharing. The sensor data that is stored in the data center of 
the environment health monitoring are already encrypted 
before. The private key is needed to decrypt the data. In the 
previous registration protocol, we describe the mechanism 
how to get the key. After the manager and users get the key, 
they can download the ciphertext from data center and 
decrypt the ciphertext to read the original data sensor. 
 
Fig. 6. Data Sharing Protocol. 
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3)  Revocation Protocol:  Fig. 7 shows the flow of user 
revocation who conducts illegal access. All the sensor data 
in the data center, that is previously encrypted, must be 
decrypted to completion in order to get the original data. To 
decrypt the data, the system requires the private key and 
attribute of the user. The user request to the data center, the 
data center responds and send the ciphertext sensor to 
download by users. User decrypts the ciphertext to read the 
original sensor data if the user cannot decrypt the ciphertext. 
The system will be saved that users conduct the illegal 
access. Data from the user who conducts illegal access will 
be stored in the data center to be revoked. The user, who has 
entered the list of revocation, will not be able to decrypt the 
data, that they request from the data center. All the sensor 
data in the data center, that is previously encrypted, must be 
decrypted to completion in order to get the original data. To 
decrypt the data, the system requires the private key and 
attribute of the user. 
 
Fig. 7. Revocation Protocol. 
 
The data center of environment health monitoring has 
many sensor data like temperature, humidity, CO and CO2, 
and noise. To perform a decryption, we create an access rule 
into four groups, which its attributes (T) are adjusted from 
data access requirements in the data center. The groups are a 
Manager (D0), Ranch Division (D1), Agriculture Division 
(D2), and Industrial Division (D3). Whereas, the data access 
right group is divided into three. Those groups will be used 
for monitoring the illegal access by users, such as the C1 
Division for CO and CO2, C2 for temperature and humidity, 
and C3 for luminosity and noise. We choose attributes from 
the user department to perform the data decryption. The 
group 1 with T1 can decrypt all data (manager). The group 2 
with T2 only decrypts the data of C2 and C3. The group 3 
with T3 only decrypts the data of C1 and C2.  To revoke an 
access of users, we add “NOT” to the policy rule to remove 
the user access for data decryption. We combine attribute 
from user division and sensor data to create rule of policy 
from ciphertext to ensure that only users with appropriate 
attributes that can decrypt. The base of access policy 
permission is defined as fig. 5. 
 
 
 
Fig. 8. Rule of Access Policy in Encrypted Data Sensor 
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We implement our system using Java server pages, where 
the communication between users, manager, and the data 
center uses HTTP with local area connection using wireless 
communication. For this system, we use a hardware device 
as seen in TABLE I below. 
 
TABLE I  
SPECIFICATION OF HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE 
 
The data sensor, which previously stored as an encryption 
in the data center, will be downloaded by the user, and if it is 
downloaded by users who have the access right, then it will 
be decrypted. The data is downloaded by the users according 
to their access rights, if the existing rules in the policy are 
not appropriate with the user’s attributes, then the ciphertext 
cannot be decrypted and its data is not readable. This makes 
the user be included in conducting illegal access, in which 
the data retrieval in the data center is not appropriate with 
their access right. The illegal access will be monitored by the 
third trust party. The user will directly be included in the 
revocation list. 
The encrypted data can only be decrypted if only if the 
ciphertext qualifies with the already made rules and the 
owner’s permission is appropriate. If the user accesses the 
data beyond their authority, the system will be saved that 
user did the illegal access, then the third trust party will 
directly put the user into the list of revocation as seen in Fig. 
10. The data that has been encrypted before, called as a 
ciphertext (CT), only readable by decrypting it first, by using 
the private key and public key as well as the attributes of the 
user. The encrypted data is downloaded by the user by 
entering the private key if the rules are appropriate with the 
policies, and the user access is not included in the list of 
revocation, then the user can read the sensor data. In this 
system, the data is encrypted by using the access policy as 
seen in Fig. 9.  
 
Fig. 9. Decryption process of ciphertext obtain from data center 
 
Fig. 10. Illegal access user process of data sensor stored in the data center 
In Fig. 10 shows, the user did the illegal access, the user 
cannot decrypt and read the original data. the attribute from 
the user is not matched with the rule of policy from the 
ciphertext. What has been done by the user will be saved in 
databases from the data center? The trust third party will 
check users who did the illegal access to the system. If the 
trust third-party find the user performs the illegal access, the 
users will be saved in the revocation list, their attributes will 
be updated so that users will unable to decrypt the ciphertext. 
The user in revocation list cannot get the original data, if the 
user wants to get the original data, their id must be deleted 
from revocation list. The user in the revocation list can 
report their id to the manager if their id stored in the 
revocation list, the user can report their access by sending an 
information report (id.user) to the manager. The manager 
accepts the report from the user and sends it to the trust third 
party to remove the user from the revocation list. Then, the 
trust third party will perform a validation for messages from 
the manager. After trust third party did the validation, the 
trust third party removes the user from the revocation list. 
Actor Details Hardware 
Data Center 
 
Intel Xeon CPU E3-1225 3.20GHz,4 GB 
DDR3, Dell Precision T1650 
Operating System 
Ubuntu Linux 16 kernel 4.4.0-22 
Software 
GMP-5.1.1,  pbc-lib-0.5.14, glib-2.34, 
openssl-1.0.1e, net beans java 8, apache-tomcat-
8.0.15. Mysql. 
Access Point TP-Link TL-WR740N  IEEE 
802.11n 
Manager, 
User, and 
Trust  Third 
Party 
Details  Hardware 
Intel core i3-3110M 2.4GHz, 4GB DDR3, 
Lenovo G400s 
Operating System 
Windows 10 64-bit 
Software 
Mozilla Firefox Browser-47 
615
Then, data center sends a message report to the user and then 
the user can access the data center and decrypt the ciphertext 
from the data center. Fig. 11  shows the flow of removing 
the user from revocation list. 
 
Fig. 11.  User deletion process through revocation list 
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The proposed system design is shown in Fig. 5. Where the 
manager and all users must register first, then the inputted 
data will be verified by the trust third party, after that the 
trust third party will generate the key (private key and public 
key). The key generated by the trust third party will be 
immediately sent to all users who was verified, we provide 
the link to register the user data and the link to download 
sensor data from data center, as seen in Fig. 12. Unregistered 
users can access the system but only view the current data 
from data center through the HTTP protocol using end 
device, they cannot download sensor data from the data 
center. 
 
 
Fig. 12. initial appearance environmental conditions for users 
 
In Fig. 13, for the user, we build the system by using 
laptop and for the data center, we use Linux Ubuntu. We use 
local area network transmission with a communication over 
an ethernet. The information of the user who already 
registered is stored in the data center and will be revoked if 
doing an illegal access. 
 
Fig. 13. Data sensor transmission from data center to user and managaer  
 
In Fig. 14, we show how the user can get the sensor data, 
users enter the date for sensor data to be acquired, after the 
user entering the sensor data. the system will be process the 
user’s request and provide a link to download the data. the 
sensor data will be encrypted by data center before user 
download the data, after the encrypt finished, the user can 
download the data in the form of ciphertext. The system of 
data encryption is using public key and attributes in 
accordance with the rule of policy from the user. 
 
Fig. 14. Downloaded the encrypted data sensor  
 
After the user downloads ciphertext of the data sensor 
from the data center, the user can access the system to get 
the plaintext of data sensor. The user can choose decryption 
menu in our system and then do the decryption. The user 
uploads a ciphertext to the system for decrypt ciphertext 
using their private key. If the attributes of user match with 
the access policies from the ciphertext, then the ciphertext 
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can be decrypted into a plaintext of the data sensor. In Fig. 
15, we shows how to decrypt the ciphertext of the data 
sensor. 
 
Fig. 15. Decryption of ciphertext data sensor 
 
In Fig. 16, we show the user who conducts illegal access 
that will be directly included in the revocation list. Users 
who are included in the revocation list cannot decrypt the 
data, this is because the attributes of the user were updated 
by the trust third party, and the attribute from the user is not 
same with the rule of access policy of the ciphertext. The 
users who are not included in the revocation list can directly 
decrypt the ciphertext. In Fig. 17, the user with the access 
right can decrypt and get the sensor data. After the 
decryption is a success, the user can view the sensor data and 
get information from the data center. 
 
 
Fig. 16. Recovered data sensor failure 
 
 
Fig. 17. Recovered data sensor after decryption 
 
All of the sensor data in our project are different for every 
division (T1, T2, and T3), the original data in the data center 
has almost the different size. In this section we use the 
wireless sensor network with communication using zigbee to 
send the sensor data to meshlium. We synchronize database 
meshlium to the database in data center. We analyze the 
processing time for encrypt, decrypt and revocation check 
using different size of sensor data. we entered date from 
sensor data with different day such one day, one week and 
one month. User make a request to the data center with 
entering date from data sensor and choose the type of data 
sensor. The original data was encrypted by the data center 
before user download the data. The ciphertext with a variety 
of access policy for every division is different for T1, T2, 
and T3. We analyze the increase data from original data to 
ciphertext, between user with access right and user in 
revocation list , the different size of ciphertext data sensor 
between user and user in revocation can be seen in Table II 
and Table III. 
 
TABLE II 
SIZE OF DATA SENSOR AFTER ENCRYPTED FROM ORIGINAL DATA TO 
CIPHERTEXT USER WITH ACCESS RIGHT 
T 
 
Sensor 
 
Original Data (KB) Ciphertext User with Access Right (KB) 
1 
Day 
1 
Week 
1 
Month 
1 
Day 
1 
Week 
1 
Month 
 
 
T1 
CO 22 112,6 363,8 22,6 113,2 364,4 
CO2 27,1 138,6 447,8 27,7 139,1 448,3 
TEMP 25,4 129,9 419,8 26 130,5 420,4 
HUM 27,1 138,6 447,8 27,7 139,1 448,3 
LUM 20,3 103,9 335,8 20,9 104,5 336,4 
NOISE 21,3 104,9 337,8 21,9 105,5 338,5 
T2 
TEMP 25,4 129,9 419,8 25,6 130,2 420,1 
HUM 27,1 138,6 447,8 27,7 139,1 448,3 
LUM 20,3 103,9 335,8 20,7 104,4 336,2 
NOISE 21,3 104,9 337,8 21,7 105,2 338,3 
T3 
CO 22 112,6 363,8 22,6 113,2 364,4 
CO2 27,1 138,6 447,8 27,7 139,1 448,3 
TEMP 25,4 129,9 419,8 26 130,5 420,4 
HUM 27,1 138,6 447,8 27,7 139,1 448,3 
 
TABLE III 
SIZE OF DATA SENSOR AFTER ENCRYPTED FROM ORIGINAL DATA TO 
CIPHERTEXT USER IN REVOCATION LIST 
 
 
T 
 
Sensor 
 
Original Data (KB) Ciphertext  User in Revocation List (KB) 
1 
Day 
1 
Week 
1 
Month 
1 
Day 
1 
Week 
1 
Month 
 
 
T1 
CO 22 112,6 363,8 23 113,4 368,4 
CO2 27,1 138,6 447,8 28,2 139,6 448,8 
TEMP 25,4 129,9 419,8 26,2 130,8 421,2 
HUM 27,1 138,6 447,8 28,1 139,4 448,8 
LUM 20,3 103,9 335,8 21,2 104,8 336,7 
NOISE 21,3 104,9 337,8 22 105,8 338,9 
 
T2 
TEMP 25,4 129,9 419,8 25,9 130,7 420,8 
HUM 27,1 138,6 447,8 27,9 139,5 448,8 
LUM 20,3 103,9 335,8 20,9 104,8 336,9 
NOISE 21,3 104,9 337,8 21,8 105,4 338,7 
 
T3 
CO 22 112,6 363,8 22,9 113,8 364,6 
CO2 27,1 138,6 447,8 27,9 139,5 448,5 
TEMP 25,4 129,9 419,8 26,2 130,8 420,7 
HUM 27,1 138,6 447,8 27,9 139,3 448,6 
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We analyze time processing from user with the access 
right and user in the revocation list such time processing for 
encrypt, decrypt and transmission time. We tried with each 
group of the user and all of sensor with the different days 
such 1 day, 1 week, and 1 month with different rule of policy 
(T).  
In Fig. 18 shows the processing time for encrypt the 
original data to ciphertext with different grub policy and all 
of data sensor for 1 day between user in revocation list and 
user with access right. For T1 to encrypt the data sensor the 
system requires less than 160 ms for user in revocation list 
and less than 155 ms for user with access right, for T2 the 
system requires less than 152 ms for user in revocation list  
and less than 148 ms for user with access right and for T3 
less than 149 ms for user in revocation list and less than 146 
ms for user with access right.  
 
Fig. 18. Processing time encryption data sensor for 1 day 
 
In Fig. 19 shows the processing time for encrypt the 
original data sensor to ciphertext with different grub policy 
and all of data sensor for 1 week between user in revocation 
list and user with access right. For T1 to encrypt the data 
sensor the system requires less than 165 ms for user in 
revocation list and less than 155 ms for user with access 
right, for T2 the system requires less than 160 ms for user in 
revocation list  and less than 148 ms for user with access 
right and for T3 less than 156 ms for user in revocation list 
and less than 154 ms for user with access right. 
.  
Fig. 19. Processing time encryption data sensor for 1 week 
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In Fig. 20 shows the processing time for encrypt the 
original data sensor to ciphertext with different grub policy 
and all of data sensor for 1 month. For T1 to encrypt the data 
sensor the system requires less than 165 ms for user in 
revocation list and less than 155 ms for user with access 
right, for T2 the system requires less than 160 ms for user in 
revocation list  and less than 148 ms for user with access 
right and for T3 less than 156 ms for user in revocation list 
and less than 154 ms for user with access right. 
 
 
Fig. 20. Processing time encryption data sensor for 1 month 
 
In Fig. 21 shows the processing time for decrypt the 
ciphertext to original data sensor with different grub policy 
and all of data sensor for 1 day. For T1 to decrypt the data 
sensor the system requires less than 130 ms for user in 
revocation list and less than 150 ms for user with access 
right, for T2 the system requires less than 135 ms for user in 
revocation list  and less than 145 ms for user with access 
right and T3 less than 132 ms for user in revocation list and 
less than 140 ms for user with access right. 
 
 
Fig. 21. Processing time decryption data sensor for 1 day 
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In Fig. 22 shows the processing time for decrypt the 
ciphertext to original data sensor with different grub policy 
and all of data sensor for 1 week. For T1 to decrypt the data 
sensor the system requires less than 140 ms for user in 
revocation list and less than 160 ms for user with access 
right, for T2 the system requires less than 140 ms for user in 
revocation list  and less than 150 ms for user with access 
right and T3 less than 136 ms for user in revocation list and 
less than 142 ms for user with access right
. 
 
Fig. 22. Processing time decryption data sensor for 1 week 
 
In Fig. 23 shows the processing time for decrypt the 
ciphertext to original data sensor with different grub policy 
and all of data sensor for 1 month. For T1 to decrypt the data 
sensor the system requires less than 145 ms for user in 
revocation list and less than 160 ms for user with access 
right, for T2 the system requires less than 145 ms for user in 
revocation list  and less than 150 ms for user with access 
right and T3 less than 140 ms for user in revocation list and 
less than 146 ms for user with access right. 
 
Fig. 23. Processing time decryption data sensor for 1 month 
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in this section we analyze time processing for 
transmission data with the diffent grub policy and all of data 
sensor for 1 day, 1 week and 1 month between user with 
access right and user in revocation list. Fig. 24,  Fig 25 and 
Fig. 26 shows the transmission data. 
In Fig. 24 shows the transmission time for transmission 
data with different grub policy and all of data sensor for 1 
day. For T1 the transmission time requires less than 160 ms 
for user in revocation list and less than 170 ms for user with 
access right, for T2 the system requires less than 165 ms for 
user in revocation list  and less than 170 ms for user with 
access right and T3 less than 160 ms for user in revocation 
list and less than 170 ms for user with access right. 
 
 Fig. 24. Processing time transmission data sensor for 1 day 
 
In Fig. 25 shows the transmission time for transmission 
data with different grub policy and all of data sensor for 1 
week. For T1 the transmission time requires less than 160 
ms for user in revocation list and less than 180 ms for user 
with access right, for T2 the system requires less than 165 
ms for user in revocation list  and less than 175 ms for user 
with access right and T3 less than 170 ms for user in 
revocation list and less than 175 ms for user with access 
right. 
 
Fig. 25. Processing time transmission data sensor for 1 week 
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In Fig. 26 shows the transmission time for transmission 
data with different grub policy and all of data sensor for 1 
month. For T1 the transmission time requires less than 160 
ms for user in revocation list and less than 180 ms for user 
with access right, for T2 the system requires less than 170 
ms for user in revocation list  and less than 185 ms for user 
with access right and T3 less than 180 ms for user in 
revocation list and less than 190 ms for user with access 
right. 
 
 
Fig. 26. Processing time transmission data sensor for 1 month 
 
We also analyze the transmission time for  our system if 
the user using Raspberry, in our research we are using 
Raspberry Pi3 model B with 1.2 GHz 64-bit quad-core 
ARMv8 and 1 GB RAM with 802.11n wireless for showing 
our system can be used in embedded system. In Fig. 27 
shows the transmission time for transmission data with 
different grub policy and all of data sensor for 1 day. For T1 
the transmission time requires less than 160 ms for user in 
revocation list and less than 270 ms for user with access 
right, for T2 the system requires less than 165 ms for user in 
revocation list  and less than 250 ms for user with access 
right and T3 less than 170 ms for user in revocation list and 
less than 280 ms for user with access right. 
 
 
 
Fig. 27. Processing time transmission data sensor for 1 day 
622
In Fig. 28 shows the transmission time for transmission 
data with different grub policy and all of data sensor for 1 
week. For T1 the transmission time requires less than 165 
ms for user in revocation list and less than 285 ms for user 
with access right, for T2 the system requires less than 160 
ms for user in revocation list  and less than 280 ms for user 
with access right and T3 less than 165 ms for user in 
revocation list and less than 270 ms for user with access 
right. 
 
 
Fig. 28. Processing time transmission data sensor for 1 week 
 
In Fig. 29 shows the transmission time for transmission 
data with different grub policy and all of data sensor for 1 
month. For T1 the transmission time requires less than 170 
ms for user in revocation list and less than 320 ms for user 
with access right, for T2 the system requires less than 160 
ms for user in revocation list  and less than 300 ms for user 
with access right and T3 less than 160 ms for user in 
revocation list and less than 340 ms for user with access 
right. 
 
 
 
Fig. 29. Processing time transmission data sensor for 1 month 
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Fig. 30 shows the processing time for the revocation 
check with the number of users around 10 up to 1000 users. 
We analyze for 1000 revoked users there are only 2 second 
processing time for revocation check. 
 
 
Fig. 30. Processing time for revocation check with 1000 user revoked 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
We added a retraction on the method of CP-ABE to 
strengthen security for users who perform illegal access and 
protect the security of the system from the user is not 
responsible. Our revoke scheme do not affect the 
performance of the system from the data center environment 
health monitoring. The revocation list can only be accessed 
by the trust third party that is trusted by the manager and the 
user to perform monitoring and validation. Our experimental 
results showed the system requires less than 170 ms for the 
user with access right to encrypt the data for one month and 
requires less than160 ms to decrypt the data with 190 ms for 
transmission time. Compared with the user in revocation list 
with the same encryption time but requires the longer time 
for decrypt the data.  to encrypt the data for one month user 
in revocation list requires less than 180 ms, for decrypt the 
data, user in revocation list requires less than 150 ms with 
170 ms for transmission time. In embedded system our 
performance system only need less than 280 ms for 
transmission time for 1 Day, 285 ms for 1 week and also less 
than 290 ms for 1 month.  Our experimental also showed 
time for the revocation check with amount 1000 users. The 
system requires less than 2 s for checking 1000 users. Our 
system with trust third party can control all of user in the 
data center from the illegal access, only third trust party can 
include the user to the revocation list and remove the user in 
the revocation list. 
Our future work is including the digital time stamp 
signature to the messages sent by the manager to perform 
monitoring for the active user and add validity of the data 
from the data center and ensure there are no changes during 
the process of transmission data. 
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